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Introduction 
International intervention into post-conflict states has over the past decades increased 
in intrusiveness, scope, and ambition. External support for police reforms comes into play in 
situations where local police capacities are absent or so dysfunctional and biased they cannot 
effectively carryout the core responsibilities of a police force.1 Reforming police after conflict 
is hence not a technical exercise aimed at strengthening an apolitical institution, but a social 
and political task that goes to the heart of local power balances and perceptions of internal 
security.2 Consequently, local organizational structures and power hierarchies influence how 
police reform is carried out most efficiently. That means local structures and hierarchies 
determine at which level of the police needs to be targeted to be most effective.  
Many authors, however, observe that whenever international police officers fail to find 
the practical nitty-gritty guidance they require in the order to implement ‘European and 
international best practices’, these officers fall back on their national guidelines and 
procedures. In a similar vein, police reform specialists have started to recommend national 
policing models and experience as guidance for post-conflict police reform. One such 
example is the recommendation to include into all reforms the so-called ‘street cops’. This 
recommendation is based on the idea that these lower ranking officers have broad discretion 
in implementing police procedures and laws on the streets. To fit their preferred style and 
mode of policing, they tend to change or adapt reforms from above (from the ‘management 
cops’). If street cops do not buy into the reforms, this tendency to modify reforms can mean 
they will not get implemented in full or as intended.3 As a result, scholars working in this field 
have recommended a bottom-up approach to police reforms to ensure proper implementation. 
 While this advice at face value sounds reasonable, it presents three interrelated 
problems. First, the scholars who originally made these recommendations drew them from 
observations of 1970s and 1980s policing problems in the UK and the US. The noted divide 
between street cops and management cops was the consequence of the beginning of 
institutionalizing policing procedures to cut down on ingrained police secrecy, graft, and 
corruption.4 As such this scholarship represented a very particular moment in time and 
reflected a policing situation prior to these changes. In this particular time and context street 
cops had a very large degree of discretion and leeway in how to interpret the laws and which 
jobs to ‘crime’ and which to ‘cuff’.5 Second, and consequentially, modern day policing in the 
UK (used as an example here) bears little resemblance to the policing practices and cultures of 
discretion described in this earlier scholarship. The modern street cop in the UK is monitored 
nearly completely, from CCTV on the streets and in all public areas of the police stations, to 
body-worn cameras by officers, trackers in police cars, and recording of all internal radio 
communications and 999 calls, not to mention members of the public with smartphones. 
Discretion to ‘cuff’ jobs, let off offenders, and bend or break policies and laws to fit their 
convenience has hence become very limited. Third, if policing in the UK has moved so far 
away from the days of Life on Mars,6 why does this outdated reality serve to inform 
international peacebuilding practices today? While some post-conflict environments may 
resemble 1970s British policing more than its modern equivalent, the uncritical import of the 
assumptions of unlimited police discretion and reform slippage—what I term the ‘street cop 
fallacy’—hinders the proper understanding of post-conflict policing realities. This chapter 
argues that such an understanding is required to allow for effective targeting of police 
reforms.  
Based on these problems with the scholarship, this chapter has three objectives. First, 
it presents and analyzes the original scholarship’s arguments about street and management 
cops to understand the assumptions and context that spawned them. From this, it draws a 
comparison with modern day British policing, which constitutes the actual national 
background British police officers fall back on in an international police reform operation. 
Second, this chapter shows that the street cop fallacy misunderstands post-conflict police 
reform contexts. Its application to international peacebuilding has clouded rather than 
supported our approach to effectively targeting police reform as the insistence on bottom-up 
reforms does not consider the particular local organization of the police. Empirical evidence 
from the EU’s two largest police support operations, the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo 
(EULEX) and the EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) (EUPM) demonstrates 
that police reform in both countries needs to follow a top-down approach due to the rigid 
hierarchy of the local polices forces’ chain of command, which negates any attempt to target 
reforms at lower level police officers. Lower ranks have no discretion whatsoever, not 
because of a high degree of institutionalization and surveillance as in Britain, but because the 
rigid hierarchy forbids delegation of power and decision-making to lower ranks. International 
police reforms in Kosovo and Bosnia therefore need to target the highest ranks and then rely 
on senior leaders to effect the changes throughout the local police. Hence, they require a top-
down rather than a bottom-up approach to police reform. Third, drawing on the different 
realities of policing (1970s-1980s UK, modern day UK, Kosovo/BiH) this chapter constructs 
a matrix of the two principles which determine these different realities, the degree of 
institutionalization, and the degree of hierarchy. A matrix along these two axes helps visualize 
the differences and understand the principles and assumptions at play in each and can serve to 
locate other post-conflict cases which divert from all three cases discussed here. This matrix 
hence allows for clearly depicting the real context of local police reform rather than 
‘borrowing’ that of other countries and times and assist in targeting police reforms to the level 
of the police where they will be most effective. The following section presents the two 
determinants of policing styles and then analyzes the policing models of Britain and the US 
before the 1970s and today, as those are the cases discussed in the scholarship that inform the 
peacebuilding recommendations regarding street cops. 
 
Life on Mars vs. Surveillance Culture 
This chapter focuses on the effective targeting of international police reforms. It shows 
that the level at which reforms are best targeted depends on two determinants: the level of 
hierarchy and the level of institutionalization. Both concepts are not binary but matters of 
degree. The position of each force on the spectra of hierarchy and institutionalization tell us 
where international police reforms need to be targeted, at the top or at the bottom.  
 Institutionalization is understood here as behavior and actions of the police being 
guided and limited by laws, policies, rules, and formal guidelines of the police organization. 
A high degree of institutionalization means that officer conduct is determined strongly by 
such laws and policies and that consequently the degree of discretion they can exercise is very 
limited. A low degree of institutionalization means that officers are only roughly guided by 
laws and policies; they can exercise a high degree of discretion and autonomy in deciding 
how to apply laws and policies. 
 Hierarchy is understood here as an indicator of the internal coherence of a police 
organization and refers to the strength of the chain of command. A high degree of hierarchy 
means that officers are guided unquestioningly by the orders of their superiors, and as long as 
they do so are protected by them in turn. A low degree of hierarchy means officers have a 
high degree of personal autonomy and may follow orders of their superiors as long as these do 
not contravene any important code of conduct (formal or informal). Likewise, in this case the 
strength of the relationship between the ranks is quite loose.  
 With this conceptual understanding in mind, the following section analyzes policing in 
the UK before and after the reforms of the 1970s and 1980s and shows how their position on 
the spectra of institutionalization and hierarchy changed as a result of these reforms.  
Policing in the 1960s and 1970s in both Britain and the US was based on the laws of 
the state and the professional judgement of the officer in interpreting and applying them. 
Police officers hence had a large degree of discretion in how and when to apply these laws. 
Waddington captures this spirit very well: “police officers do not mechanically enforce the 
law: they pay attention to some incidents and not to others; they invoke their formal powers 
against some suspects while allowing others to go with a warning; they pay more attention to 
some people than to others. In other words, discretion is the pivot upon which the exercise of 
authority revolves”.7 Discretion was aided by the low degree of external accountability and 
high ethos of solidarity in which officers, even if they made a mistake, could often rely on 
their line managers or peers to help them cover it up. 
It is this solidarity and cohesion of the police, including the higher ranks, that street 
cops in 1980s New York lamented to have lost, according to the observational work of 
Francis Ianni and Elizabeth Reuss-Ianni.8 Their work captures a point in time in the US in 
which this ethos and style of policing was in the process of being reformed due to the 
downsides of solidarity, namely corruption and graft. The authors found that as a result of this 
top-down reform process, which aimed at greater accountability of the police, the police 
became divided into what they call ‘street cops’ and ‘management cops’.9 Street cops are 
lower ranking officers who exercised a large degree of autonomy in their style of policing. 
They were disgruntled about the reforms that centralized decision-making at the higher levels, 
thus reducing their autonomy. Hence a split was observed by the authors in which street cops 
started to view the ‘management cops’ as being separate and more closely aligned with 
politics and holding a different ethos of policing. Street cops preferred the ‘good old days’ of 
policing using their gut-level and professional experience to guide them rather than 
implementing the policies of “management”.10 Essentially, senior leaders were aiming to cut-
down the discretion of officers and make policing more coherent and accountable by 
instituting standardized policies and guidelines. Lower level officers viewed these attempts 
with suspicion as they preferred to keep their discretion and autonomy rather than have their 
“hands tied” by such reforms. 
 The divergence in policing cultures between the street cops and the management cops 
led to reforms and programs introduced by management being adjusted and changed by street 
cops to fit their preferred style and ethos of policing. Simon Holdaway, a policing scholar, 
gives several examples of how management reforms to cut down on street robberies were 
changed by street cops to the degree that the original intent of the changes was no longer 
recognizable.11 Such reform or project slippage and adjustment is what Ianni and Reuss-Ianni 
also highlight with regard to the division between the two policing cultures, suggesting that 
any reform needs to be bought into by street cops to ensure it actually gets implemented as 
intended. Nigel Fielding and Tank Waddington, British policing scholars, come to the same 
conclusion based on their work with the British police in the 1970s and 1980s.12 It is 
important to note that these works observed and explained a temporary and dynamic process 
particular to the late 1970s and 1980s (and to a degree in the 1990s) in both Britain and the 
US. This process was characterized by the clash of the “Life on Mars” style of policing (high 
discretion and autonomy) and the beginning of surveillance policing that sought to eradicate 
both in the name of institutionalization and accountability. Although this scholarship captures 
a time in which top-down reforms were harder to enforce due to the insistence of street cops 
on their autonomy, it finally did succeed in regulating street cop conduct.  
 Consequently, reading the police scholarship of the 1980s and 1990s today (2016) 
makes it sound as though it was describing a different planet, especially if one had not lived 
through those times. Policing in Britain today is no longer characterized by high levels of 
discretion and autonomy, but rather by the comprehensive surveillance and accountability the 
police are subject to by their internal Police Standards Department, the Police and Crime 
Commissioner, the Independent Police Complaints Commission, and of course the media and 
general public. While this does not exclude the possibility of leeway in certain instances, 
Waddington’s dictum that ‘police do not mechanically enforce the law’ no longer rings true 
today as the web of policies, laws, and guidelines has become so dense as to leave little 
discretion for the officers and actually makes their policing-style resemble that of a 
bureaucratic machine. In that sense, the top-down reforms succeeded.13 
 To visualize policing in 2016 Britain, compared to the 1970s and 1980s, one can 
simply follow the trail of any incoming 999 call. The initial call and the reply of the control 
room are recorded as are all radio-communications between officers, including units being 
sent to the address of the caller. The time it takes a supervisor to pick up the new job created 
by the call and dispatch a unit is recorded (‘dispatch time’). Trackers in the police cars give 
supervisors the chance to monitor where the unit is at any point in time. The response time of 
the unit is recorded and becomes part of the force’s statistics on service delivery. At the scene, 
the body-worn cameras of the officers record their entire encounter with the caller and their 
dealing with the situation.14 If the scene of the incident is in a public place, CCTV footage 
will record the police officer’s actions and often individual members of the public do the same 
on their smartphones, especially if force is used. If anyone is arrested at the scene, the arrest is 
also captured on the body-worn cameras of the officers. All public areas of police stations, 
including the custody block, to which the arrested person is then brought, are monitored by 
CCTV with audio, including interview rooms and holding cells. The interviews are recorded 
and strict rules apply as to how long all custody records have to be stored. All detained 
individuals have the right to make a phone call, speak to their solicitor at any time, be served 
meals and drinks, and have a period of eight hours of rest in the 24 hours the police can hold 
them (Interviews with British police officers, April 2016; House of Commons 1984).15 
 What this illustration shows is the limited opportunities police officers today have to 
exercise the kind of discretion the scholarship on the 1980s and 1990s discusses. Police 
conduct is not only monitored on the streets, in public places, and private homes, but also in 
the police station. All conduct is furthermore subject to internal and external investigations. 
This serves to discourage the form of solidarity that in the past lead officers to help colleagues 
cover up mistakes or policy breaches.16 Such cover-ups are also made harder by the 
institutionalization of Victim Satisfaction Call-Backs, a policy introduced by all forces around 
the late 2000s, in which supervisors randomly call up victims of investigated crimes to ask 
whether they were satisfied with the police service provided.17 Further, a formal policy on 
handling domestic violence, an area in which previously discretion was broad, was brought in 
as of 2009. This policy requires officers to fill in a DASH (domestic abuse, stalking, honor-
based violence) form, essentially a tick list of whether the severity of a case is to be graded 
‘standard’, ‘medium’, or ‘high’, which then determines the police response. This has closed 
off the possibility of officers accepting threadbare accounts of victims claiming to have ‘fallen 
down’ or ‘having run into an open door’ because they are scared of the perpetrator’s reaction 
or the lack of interest and action by the police. At the same time ‘positive action’ policies 
were introduced, meaning the police had to act, at the very least, to remove one party from the 
dispute scene or put future safeguards into place. The possibility to ‘cuff’ jobs, has hence been 
further limited.18 
The essential difference between policing in the 1970s and before and policing in 2016 
is the degree of institutionalization and accountability; an ongoing process the above policy 
changes show. While policing scholars Gordon Peake and Otwin Marenin rightly point out 
that the police reform community tends to re-invent the wheel rather than read the lessons 
provided by their predecessors, this comparison does highlight the absurdity of 
recommending post-conflict police reform lessons based on a UK and US policing reality that 
no longer exists.19 Rather than follow the street cop fallacy, the following sections show the 
realities of police reform in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina and highlight how these realities 
determine where to focus police reforms most effectively.  
 
International Police Reform 
The question of what policing is has filled many books.20 A useful definition is 
provided by Waddington, who considers policing “the exercise of the authority of [the] state 
over the civil population. That authority is based on the monopoly of legitimate coercion. 
How this is done and the way that policing is organized reflects the relationship between the 
civil population and the state.”21 This definition draws attention to several features that make 
policing such an important task. First, the police are the most visible arm of the state. As the 
primary internal security instrument, police are tasked with maintaining civil law and order in 
the state, as opposed to the military who are in charge of external security. Second, the police 
embody the state’s legitimate right to the use force. In the Weberian understanding, a state’s 
sovereignty is defined precisely by this monopoly of the use of force.22 How police are used 
and structured is therefore a key political concern for the state and its citizens. Finally, the 
police’s organizational culture mirrors the state’s approach to its own citizens. The police can, 
at extreme ends, either serve the state and protect it against its population, or it can serve the 
citizens and ensure their security.23 The police therefore play a key role in the organizational 
structure of a state. 
 In civil wars, law and order breaks down or is enforced by military rather than civilian 
means. This confounds the traditional internal and external security roles of the police and 
military.24 Additionally, the police itself often become embroiled in the conflict, and lose their 
civilian nature and neutrality. In many cases the police become or have traditionally been 
tools of oppression in the hands of elites and used against the population or parts of the 
population.25 In order to ensure lasting peace, conditions have to be created in which the 
police maintain law and order, protect all civilians, and are accountable to comprehensive 
civilian controls.26  
Ideally, each society can create these conditions internally. However, after conflict the 
resources and capabilities of states and the ties that hold together society are often shattered. 
External support for police reforms comes into play in such situations where either police 
capacities are absent, or so dysfunctional and biased they cannot effectively carry out the core 
responsibilities listed above.27 Reforming police after conflict is hence not a technical exercise 
aimed at strengthening an apolitical institution, but a social and political task that goes to the 
heart of local power balances and perceptions of internal security.28 Consequently, local 
organizational structures and power hierarchies influence how police reform is carried out 
most efficiently and which level of the police it needs to target to be most effective. The 
following case studies show that unless the organizational structures of the local police are the 
subject of reform, it is most effective to work with them rather than against them.  
 
EU Police Building 
Throughout the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s, the EU witnessed its dependence on US 
warfighting ability. The militaries of the member states were unprepared for anything but 
territorial defence, lacked force projection capabilities, and a common strategic culture.29 In 
reaction, France and Britain signed what became known as the St Malo Declaration in 
December 1998, which states that ‘the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, 
backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do 
so, in order to respond to international crises’.30 The outcome was the Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP), inaugurated in 1999, with which the EU equipped itself with the 
mechanisms for conducting independent military and civilian crisis management. While the 
development of military means had been prioritized and made headlines both internationally 
and in the member states, it was the civilian crisis management capacities which have grown 
fastest and from which the vast majority of missions have been deployed so far.31 Civilian 
Crisis Management, which includes police reform, is the EU equivalent of United Nations 
peacebuilding. Both can potentially apply to pre- and post-conflict situations in which non-
military tools are required to secure peace and stability. The EU deployed its first 
peacebuilding mission on 1 January 2003, the EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
 
The Yugoslav Legacy 
This section analyses police reform efforts by the EU in Kosovo and Bosnia and 
illustrates on the bases of empirical data where on the spectra of hierarchy and 
institutionalization these forces can be found, and how this position determines their policing 
styles. As argued above, the organizational style of any police force determines at which level 
police reforms are targeted most effectively. 
Kosovo and Bosnia had both been part of the communist state of Yugoslavia since 
1945 and emerged in their current form after the protracted and violent struggles known as the 
Yugoslav wars.32 Bosnia had been a republic within Yugoslavia and hence one of its 
constituent units with the theoretical right to secede. Just how theoretical this right was, 
became obvious when the government declared Bosnia’s independence from Yugoslavia in 
1992 and was subsequently invaded by troops from Serbia and Croatia fighting to retain the 
territory of ‘their’ ethnic groups. In the four years of civil war, Bosnia was torn apart and the 
Bosnian police, divided into ethnically coherent units, turned into paramilitary troops that 
were involved in some of the worst atrocities committed during the war.33  
 Kosovo had been an autonomous province of the Republic of Serbia despite its ethnic 
Albanian majority and was thus considered part of Serbia even after the war. Serbia, under 
Slobodan Milosevic, instituted an effective “apartheid regime” in Kosovo from 1989 onwards, 
banning Albanians from holding public office and other jobs, or being taught in their own 
language.34 The Kosovo conflict became militarized in 1997/98 when Kosovo-Albanians saw 
the international community resolving the Bosnian war without considering the situation of 
Kosovo-Albanians. The Kosovo Liberation Army started an armed insurgency against the 
Serbian regime that controlled Kosovo which lasted until March 1999 when NATO decided to 
stop what was amounting to ethnic cleansing by the Serbian Army in Kosovo.35 However, 
after the withdrawal of Serbian troops, the Serbian controlled administration broke down, 
necessitating a UN administration of Kosovo.36 Kosovo-Albanians declared independence 
from Serbia unilaterally in 2008 and remain to this date in legal limbo as Serbia and Russia 
block their acceptance into the UN to deny them international legitimacy. The Kosovo police, 
controlled and staffed mainly by Serbs, disintegrated after the NATO bombings. 
 While the approach of the international community to police reform in the two 
countries was as different as their respective situations after the wars, their local background 
of police styles was remarkably similar, being shaped by existing and traditional Yugoslav 
policing mentalities. Beginning in 1996, Bosnian police reform was carried out by the 
International Police Training Force (IPTF), mandated by the United Nations. It was mandated 
to vet all officers for war crimes and significantly reduce the size of the police force, which 
had swelled during the war. Despite criticisms and drawbacks, IPTF succeeded in 
demilitarizing the Bosnian police, reasserting its role and self-understanding as a civilian law 
and order enforcer, and starting to create the mindset of public service.37 The European Union 
Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM) took over from IPTF in January 2003 with 
the mandate to bring the local police ‘closer to European standards’.38  
In Kosovo, however, the decision was taken by the UN mission to build up a new 
police force from scratch and takeover executive policing of the country in the meantime. The 
Kosovo Police (KP) started acting as an independent police force in charge of the territory 
after the country’s declaration of independence in 2008 as local politicians refused to respect 
the UN mission’s right and legitimacy in governing and policing.39 The Kosovo government 
did, however, accept the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) for advising and monitoring the 
local police.40 As Kosovo is not recognized as an independent state by the UN and some EU 
member states, EULEX officially continues the UN policy of not recognizing Kosovo’s 
independence and treating Kosovo’s status as unresolved. This is, however, only diplomatic 
window-dressing to maintain Russian and Serbian support for the operation as much of 
EULEX’s work is based on Kosovo state laws.41 
 Both Bosnia and Kosovo hence have featured two of the largest and most 
comprehensive EU police missions to date; EUPM closed down in June 2012 after nine years 
on the ground, while EULEX is still ongoing. There are excellent works on both missions and 
the impact they have or have not had on the local police, but this chapter focuses on the 
structures and hierarchies of the two police forces in order to explore how international 
reforms can be best targeted.42  
 
Hierarchy Trumps All 
Despite their different experiences during and after the Yugoslav wars, both Kosovo 
and Bosnia share the legacy of Yugoslav policing, which remains visible and strong in both 
‘new’ forces. The police in the former Yugoslavia was a highly professional force whose aim 
was to protect the state from internal threats. Policing was therefore directed against 
controlling the behavior and action of the population and ensuring their support to the state. 
The police adhered to a very strict understanding of hierarchy within the command structure, 
which made decision-making rigid and consequently slow.43 This organizational legacy of 
Yugoslav times has persisted despite the reforms in Bosnia and the creation of the Kosovo 
Police. Both forces display a very strict command structure characterized by little to no 
delegation of power to middle-management or lower ranks, centralization of decision-making 
at the top (no matter how small the decision) and consequently very little discretion for lower 
ranking officers. Any changes or reforms need to follow this top-down organizational 
structure. Diversion from this command structure is penalized swiftly and harshly and the 
weakness of the local police federations mean officers know better than to argue with their 
superiors.44 A local cultural tradition of respect for authority figures and elders further 
compounds this absolute hierarchy.  
 It is this reality of policing in Bosnia and Kosovo in which the reforms of EULEX and 
EUPM haven been taking place. For both operations, no reform of the police structure and 
organization was envisioned, which means any reforms have to occur with the consent of the 
existing leadership. Both operations employed colocation as a means of delivering reforms. 
Colocation means placing international officers alongside their local counterparts to monitor, 
mentor, and advise them in accordance with the mandates of the two missions. 
 In Bosnia, the first of the two missions, colocation was only effected at the middle- 
and senior ranks of the local police as the EU wanted to exercise a small footprint and not be 
too intrusive.45 EUPM therefore did not work with ‘street cops’ but focused their reforms on 
the higher ranks. Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite criticize this lack of involvement 
with lower ranks quoting the 1980s and 1990s scholarship which highlights the danger of not 
including street cops into the reform process. For these authors, EUPM’s organizational 
approach to reform was therefore a direct explanation for the mission’s failure to implement 
reforms in a meaningful way.46 
 However, my own field work in Bosnia, combined with an examination of EUPM’s 
monthly reports, show a different picture. While EUPM was clearly struggling to implement 
reforms and to obtain local support beyond rhetoric and empty gestures, this was not because 
of their organizational approach but because of the content of the reforms. The Dayton Peace 
Agreement of 1995 established a Bosnian state that comprised two strong (ethnically-based) 
entities: the Bosniak-Croat Federation and the Serb-majority but ethnically mixed Republika 
Srpska (RS), hence achieving peace by separating the warring parties.47 Policing is an entity 
right, which, in the Republika Srpska is conducted by one centralized force and in the 
Federation by 10 cantonal forces.48 EUPM’s mandate and reform program aimed at 
strengthening the central level of the state and support the Office of the High Representative’s 
project to centralize the police, abolishing the decentralized system of police. 49 These reform 
projects threatened the established local power structures in the RS and the delicate balance of 
power between the ethnic groups in mixed Federation cantons such as Mostar.  
The RS vehemently opposed any reforms that would take policing rights away from the 
entities, arguing that policing is a vital security guarantee for Serbs in the Bosniak-majority 
Bosnian state, and that such a change would contravene the constitution; a valid assertion.50 In 
the mixed Federation cantons like Mostar the police became a tool for ethnic power plays in 
which the two groups, Bosniaks and Croats, asserted their dominance and ensured protection 
of their own respective group. While now in one Federation, Mostar is the stark reminder that 
these two groups were initially enemies that fought a very bitter war in and around Mostar. 
They only allied in February 1994 to face the greater threat of the Serbian military.51 
Interviews with local police officers and former EUPM staff show the entrenched nature of 
these power struggles in Mostar. At the time of my field work, the position of police 
commissioner had been vacant for over three months as the two groups could not agree on a 
candidate. The fact that there was a ‘neutral’ board that was meant to make the appointment 
(introduced by IPTF reforms) was literally laughed at by one interviewee, a high-ranking 
Mostar police officer.52 Politics and ethnic power struggles pervade policing in Bosnia and the 
following statement of the International Crisis Group rings as true today as it did at the time 
of the report:  
The role of the police is not seen as being to ‘serve and protect’ everyone, but to 
serve and protect ‘one’s own kind’, whether they be co-nationals, colleagues or 
political master. The communist-era doctrine that the police exist to defend the 
regime persists, except that the working class has been replaced by the nation as 
the ostensible beneficiary. Even ‘moderate’ politicians expect—and are often 
allowed—to influence investigations, recruitment, and budgetary allocations.53 
The police are linked directly to politics, usually through the senior police ranks. While this 
link is institutionalized through the oversight of the Ministry of Interior it is abused to take 
direct influence in the running and operations of the police. Both EUPM reports and 
interviewees tell tales of aborted investigations, lost evidence, or unwilling investigators in 
cases related to well-connected individuals or politicians.54 The years-long struggle with the 
RS to persuade them to ‘find’ former Bosnian-Serb leaders wanted by The Hague for war 
crimes, including Radovan Karadzic, illustrates this problem.55  
 The abuse of power, in which the police is an important tool, also has considerable 
influence on the way policing is conducted and the chain of command. EUPM’s struggle to 
implement community policing as a new approach in which the community serves as a 
partner and reference point for policing priorities, was characteristic for the content of the 
reforms being the problem, not their organizational approach.56 Community policing was 
meant to heal the broken trust between the population (particularly ethnic minorities living in 
a majority area) and the police that had become militarized and actively participated in the 
atrocities committed during the war.57 These reforms entail by definition a delegation of 
power from the higher ranks to lower ranked community police officers and to the 
community.  
 EUPM’s community policing reforms were introduced into the Federation cantons and 
the RS in May 2004.58 Implementation consisted of four different stages through which all 
Federation cantons worked without major problems. In the RS, however, the Ministry of 
Interior, responsible for the police, refused pointblank to introduce the reforms.59 Only after 
considerable pressure was put on the RS leadership by EUPM and the OHR (including 
threatening to fire recalcitrant officers) were the reforms slowly started in November 2004. 
They were reported as finished in 2005.60 Speaking to officers of the RS police and members 
of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) reveals that these reforms were resisted because they 
threatened the tight grip the MOI holds over the police. Delegation of power was equated with 
‘loss of power’, which was resisted at all costs.61 In the ethnically mixed canton of Mostar, 
where implementation had worked fine, community policing was abandoned the minute the 
EUPM co-locators left. Mostar today does not have a community policing concept for the 
same reasons as the RS.62 
 These examples showcase that the problems EUPM faced in implementing their 
reforms were due to local resistance to the content and consequences of reform, rather than 
the fact they did not consult street cops. Indeed, EUPM learned very quickly, as did I with 
regard to obtaining permission for my interviews, that in Bosnia all policing decisions are 
taken by senior leaders. There is consequently no point whatsoever in consulting street cops 
about reforms, or indeed trying to interview them without senior rank permission. The 
Yugoslav legacy in Bosnia entails an almost absolute chain of command without delegation of 
power to lower ranks. As these reform examples show, the slightest indication that a 
delegation of power would be required was resisted greatly.63 
 The scholarship on post-conflict police reform uses Kosovo as an example of how the 
EU has learned from its mistakes, as in Kosovo co-location was affected throughout all ranks 
of the police.64 International officers accompanied their counterparts ranging from lower 
ranking officers to the general director of the police. Speaking to EULEX staff, however, 
reveals that this was simply window-dressing as working with lower ranks was ‘incredibly 
frustrating’ and ‘pointless’.65 All interviewees confirmed the same story. Lower ranking 
officers were friendly and interested in the reforms, but would refuse to implement anything 
without the direct order of their line manager. If problems of cooperation or with details of the 
reforms occurred with a lower ranking officer, the EULEX member of staff would have to 
speak to his EULEX superior to get him to speak to his local counterpart and make him order 
his lower ranked officer to comply with the reform. Lower ranked officers showed no 
flexibility in making decisions even if they were officially within their remit but always 
consulted with their line manager, who usually then consulted his, all the way up to the senior 
management. This was a time-consuming exercise that frustrated EULEX officers who told 
me they were simply not used to such a lack of delegation of power.66 The same was true for 
middle-management ranks, who were also unwilling to make decisions. One long-serving 
EULEX officer observed ‘this is not a chain of command they have here. There is flexibility 
in any chain, between the links, you know. This here is a rod of command’.67  
While politicization of the police is less of a problem in Kosovo’s day-to-day policing, 
it does permeate the senior ranks. This is facilitated by the Law on Police, which makes the 
general director appointable by the Prime Minister for terms as short as six weeks.68 This 
ensures political control of the direction of the police and is used to cut short investigations 
into well-connected individuals or members of government.69 This also could be seen in the 
reaction of local officers when co-located with EULEX officers during investigations into 
organized crime or in cases of alleged corruption. In many cases, the local officers would 
simply admit they did not feel comfortable investigating the case as they feared the 
consequences. The same is true for local judges, many of whom refused to try certain 
individuals.70 EULEX reforms that targeted the interface between the police and the 
prosecution were never started on the local side for in transparent reasons including ‘lack of 
resources’71 That is the reason EULEX was granted executive powers in investigating and 
trying individuals for war-crimes, serious financial crimes, as well as corruption and 
organized crime. However, their track-record is, for different reasons, not much better.72 
The Yugoslav legacy of a strict command structure, no delegation of power, and little 
discretion for lower ranking officers is hence as present in Kosovo as it is in Bosnia. EULEX 
staff equally had to learn quickly that targeting the senior ranks of the police was the only 
effective way of getting anything done. This comparative analysis of Bosnia and Kosovo 
shows that despite the different approaches to police reform taken by the international 
community, vetting versus recreating the police, and the difference between EUPM and 
EULEX with regards to colocation, the result was similar in both cases. In both countries, the 
local police judged police reforms on their content and the danger they posed to entrenched 
authorities rather than on whether they targeted lower ranked officers. Whenever the local 
police had a general director who was supportive of international reforms, their reform 
implementation increased in speed and ease, whereas general directors who were suspicious 
of the international influence slowed reforms down.73  
The absolute power of the chain of command in Kosovo and Bosnia means that any 
reforms that have senior management backing will be enforced through the chain and 
implemented correctly. This was shown during many of my interviews at police stations 
across Kosovo, which were implementing EULEX’s reforms. The station managers often did 
not know that these reforms were not police chain of command reforms, because that was 
who ordered them to be implemented. Once the reforms become part of the local chain of 
command, implementation is almost guaranteed as, like in Bosnia, the hierarchy of the police 
trumps all other considerations of lower ranking officers, even if they doubt the merit of the 
reforms. A bottom-up approach to police reform that targets street cops is hence ineffective 
and impractical in both Kosovo and Bosnia. 
 
A Policing Matrix 
This chapter deals with several different fields of policing scholarship and concepts. This 
section draws these diverse issues together and highlights the determinants that underlie the 
different policing cultures that have been discussed. This section shows that all these styles 
work on the spectra of two policing principles: institutionalization and hierarchy. As 
elaborated above, the position on each spectrum determines the ensuing policing style and 
tells us how to approach reforms. The different styles of policing this chapter has explored all 
fall at different points on the matrix constructed by these two policing principles. The below 
graph is a visualization of the matrix and the approximate positions the different policing 
styles take.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 1: Matrix of Hierarchy and Institutionalization. 
 
This graph illustrates the different degrees of institutionalization and hierarchy that determine 
the policing style of the forces analyzed here: the UK before the late 1970s, the UK in 2016, 
and Kosovo and Bosnia pre- and post-conflict. The graph shows the result of the process of 
reforms the countries went through and how it changed their place in the matrix. Kosovo and 
Bosnia retained a very high degree of hierarchy in which orders are obeyed without question. 
However, the reforms did have an impact on the degree of institutionalization of the local 
police forces. Writing and implementing policies for the forces was a large part of the reform 
agenda of both EUPM and EULEX, and while some of the more controversial policies and 
SOPs have only ended up in senior leaders’ drawers, many others are being implemented and 
have led to a more coherent approach to policing. Examples of this include a more coherent 
approach to traffic policing in Kosovo where officers only issue penalty notices, but to deter 
corruption they do not collect fines on the spot. Also, the public complaints procedure in both 
countries has been regulated to ensure a systematic collection and response to complaints 
about officers rather than burying them. This is mirrored in Kosovo by the high approval 
ratings of the population for their local police, crucial documents that do not exist in this form 
for Bosnia.74  
 Policing in the UK changed from a position in which hierarchy trumped 
institutionalization (the 1960s and 1970s) to a position in which institutionalization is so 
strong that officers will no longer unquestioningly follow orders they know to breach policy. 
This does of course still happen, but only in minor cases, and it is more often that officers 
report incidents they have witnessed, including examples of arresting a colleague for drunk 
driving, inappropriate sexual relations with victims, or breach of data protection.75 Hierarchy 
still matters of course; an order is binding for officers unless it breaches policies or law. 
 The police are an inherently hierarchical organization, but the style of policing 
nevertheless fluctuates between the ends of these two spectra. In police forces that are located 
on the higher end of the hierarchy spectrum, it is unlikely that lower ranking police officers 
will have much discretion beyond what they are granted from the chain of command. The 
same is true for officers of police forces that are located high on the institutionalization 
spectrum, but for the different reason that their actions are guided and limited by existing 
policies and laws, rather than their line managers. 
Understanding these determinants of policing styles and how they align can provide a 
guide for successful police reforms. Street cops will have discretion in some forces and in 
those cases making sure they are on board with the reforms will have an impact on how 
successfully they are implemented and adhered to. However, there are many forces, post-
conflict or not, where for different reasons targeting reforms at street cops is a waste of time 
and may in the worst case alienate the senior management, further limiting the chance of 
success. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has critically analyzed the scholarship and the context in which the 
writings on street and management cops originated. It has found that the very specific time 
and policing context this scholarship describes no longer corresponds to policing realities in 
the UK. That means first, that the current policing background UK officers seconded to 
international police operations would fall back on is very different to that described in the 
street cop scholarship dating from the 1980s and 1990s. Second, if many Western states have 
overcome this state of policing that underlies the street cop scholarship, why would we apply 
it to post-conflict police reforms? While it is certainly useful to learn lessons from past 
scholars and practitioners as Peake and Marenin point out, it is absurd to apply lessons based 
on a UK and US policing reality that no longer exists (and with good reason). 
 Underlying the street cop fallacy is a useful distinction between targeting police 
reforms at the top or at the bottom level of the organization. However, as this chapter has 
demonstrated, which level is targeted needs to be informed by the policing realities of the 
country the mission operates in and not simply by a wholesale import of recommendations 
from a (potentially outdated) academic scholarship. The final section of this chapter has 
drawn out the operating principles that determine the policing style of any police force: the 
position a force takes on the matrix of hierarchy and institutionalization. Understanding this 
position assists in targeting police reforms to the level they can operate at most effectively. 
Police forces that are strictly hierarchical like the ones in Kosovo and Bosnia will adopt a top-
down approach to reforms and this needs to be recognized by the implementing international 
agencies—unless it is the organizational approach that is subject to reform. In addition to 
technical expertise, successful reform requires knowledge of the local context, culture, and 
police organization, something few international operations have recognized.76 
 Targeting police reforms to the right level of the police means utilizing the local 
organizational power for its own benefit. In Kosovo and Bosnia, the absolute power of the 
chain of command meant that once reforms had been accepted by the senior management, 
implementation and adherence were almost guaranteed. Given the increasingly tight budgets 
of international operations, especially since the last economic downturn, operations and their 
sending organizations are under pressure to deliver results and show success.77 Finally, donors 
and practitioners have increasingly understood the importance of winning local legitimacy 
and support for their projects and reforms as legitimacy can ensure local compliance and 
support for reforms, which in turn increases the likelihood of the reforms becoming 
sustainable.78 Targeting reforms to the right level of the police means working ‘with the 
grain’, utilizing the power of the local organization, and ideally winning their legitimacy and 
respect for showing knowledge and consideration to local organizational practices. 
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